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Adverse Possession-Public Lands-Presumption of Lost Grant
-In an action by the United States to quiet title to the Pacific island of
Palmyra, defendants claimed by possession under a lost grant to their
predecessors from the King of Hawaii in 1862, and an Hawaiian Land
Court certificate of title duly issued in 1912.1 The United States claimed
title as successor to the King of Hawaii, alleging that a grant was not in
fact made, and that the decree of the Land Court in 1912 was not binding
upon the United States. Upon this second appeal, 2 the circuit court of
appeals, in affirming the decision of the lower court, held (two judges
dissenting) 3 that the evidence justified presumption of a lost grant to
defendants, and that the Land Court decree was conclusive upon the United
States.4 United States v. Fullard-Leo et al., 156 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A.
9th, 1946).
Whether intermittent occupation and use of land under claim of
ownership will vest title in the claimants -necessarily depends upon the
location and character of the land and the peculiar circumstances of the
case. The common law fiction of presumed lost grant, invented to protect
long, peaceful possession in situations where the statute of limitations is
inoperative, has been invoked against the state as well as against private
persons.5 Where the United States has contested title to land in acquired
territories, the Supreme Court, following a policy of resolving doubts in
I. Palmyra is located about IOOO miles 'south of the Hawaiian Islands. In 1862,
two Hawaiian citizens took possession of Palmyra in the name of and in accordance
with a commission from the King of Hawaii. Existing Hawaiian documents con-
cerning the- transaction do not indicate what interest was acquired by these citizens to
whom defendants trace title. The United States contends that it was at most a lease,
defendants that subsequent conveyances and possession indicate a lost grant of title.
Defendants proved occupation of the island by their predecessors or themselves or
lessees for an indefinite period beginning in 1862, one year in 1885-1886, two weeks in
1913, one month in 1914, one year in 192o-1921, 12 days in 1924, the sending of trees
and plants in 1933, 1935, 1936, and 1937, and payment of taxes in 1885, 1886, 1887, and
from 1913 to the time of suit. United States v. Fullard-Leo et al., 66 F. Supp. 782,
785 (D. C. D. Haw., 1944).
2. For insufficiency of evidence to exhibit title in the United States, the action was
first dismissed. United Stdtes v. Fullard-Leo et al., 66 F. Supp. 774 (D. C. D. Haw.,
194O), reversed and remanded, 133 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943), petition for a
writ prohibiting retrial denied, 142 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944). Upon retrial,
title was quieted in defendants, 66 F. Supp. 782 (D. C. D. Haw., 1944).
3. Judges Denman and Bone dissent vigorously on the evidence from the inference
of a lost grant, and from the decision that the Land Court decree is conclusive upon
the Government.
4. The Supreme Court granted certiorari Oct. 14, 1946. (1946) 15 U. S. L. WEEK
3135.
5. The fiction of presumed grant, first applied in favor of immemorial possessors
of incorporeal rights (7 HoLDswoRa, HIsT. ENG. LAW (2d ed. 1937) 343 et seq.)
was later extended to long, peaceful possession of land, in situations Wvhere the statute
of limitations was inoperative, in favor of private and corporate claimants against the
state: Carino v. Insular Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 212 U. S. 449 (19o9) ; United
States v. Chavez, 175 U. S. 509 (1899) ; United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452
(1895) ; State v. Taylor, 135 Ark. 232, 205 S. W. 104 (1918) ; State v. Dickinson, 129
Mich. 221, 88 N. W. 621 (19Ol) ; People v. Town of Brookhaven, 146 Misc. 473, 261
N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sup. Ct., 1932) ; In Re Title of Kioloku, 25 Haw. 357 (1920) ; as
well as against private persons and corporations: Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534
(1887) ; Trustees of Schools v. Lilly, 373 II. 431, 26 N. E. (2d) 489 (194o) ; Univ.
of Vermont v. Carter, iio Vt. 2o6, 3 A. (2d) 533 (1939) ; see Ricard v. Williams, 7
Wheat. 59, 119 (U. S., 1822). Whether the presumption is rebuttable or conclusive
has been the subject of some confusion. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed., i94o) §:2522.
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favor of bona fide private claimants, has confirmed title on the basis of
long, continuous and peaceful possession. 6 Is the policy applicable to a
possessory claim based upon occupation which has been interrupted for
long periods of time? Although continuous occupation is normally re-
quired, legal possession has been held to continue when the intermittent
acts of the claimant were consistent with the character of the land and its
use.7 The Supreme Court has found the reason for the requirement of"actual possession" in the notoriety it gives to the assertion of title, and
has applied the fiction of presumed grant when the interruptions did not
impair the uses to which the claimant subjected the property and for
which it was chiefly valuable." It appears that the circuit court properly
minimized interruptions of occupation in the case of an uninhabited island
far from civilized communities and chiefly valuable for guano, copra, and
military use. The fact that no question of title arose until 1938 when the
Navy sought to lease the island appears to have weighed heavily in favor
of the private' claimants in relation to the brief periods of occupation.
Whether or not the Land Court decree is in itself binding upon the United
States,9 the notoriety of claim of title combined with intermittent acts of
ownership consistent with the character of the land furnish reasonable
But it has been invoked merely for the purpose of quieting title in the possessor by a
fiction. Fletcher v. Fuller, supra; 4 TiFFANy, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed., 1939) § 1136.
It has been suggested that the present validity of the maxim indlum tempus occurrit
regi is that the state will not lose title by prescription to land subject to a public use,
such as a highway. Note (1936) 23 VA. L. REv. 58. See also note (1915) 29 HARV.
L. REv. z.
6. Carino v. Insular Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 212 U. S. 449 (199o) (Pos-
session proved for over 50 years without grant from Spanish Crown) ; United States
v. Chavez, 175 U. S. 509 (1899) (Continuous possession proved from about 1785 to
time of suit under claim of title by Spanish grant) ; United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S.
452 (1895) (Possession proved from 1833 to time of suit with claim of grant from
Mexican Gov't) ; It Re Title of Kioloku, 25 Haw. 357 (1920) (Possession -proved
from 187o to time of suit).
7. Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534 (1887) ; Cross v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co.,
172 N. C. 119, 90 S. E. 14 (1916) ; Herndon v. Casiano, 7 Tex. 322 (85); Webb v.
Richardson, 42 Vt. 465 (i869).
8. Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534, 552 (1887) (Entry to quarry rock in 1835,
and evidence of quarrying during the period from 1846 to time of suit with occasional
interruptions).
9. Under the Hawaiian Organic Act, 31 STAT. 141 (1900). 48 U. S. C. § 51I
(1940), public property ceded to the United States by the Republic of Hawaii remained
in the "possession, use, and control" of the Territory of Hawaii. The laws of Hawaii
relating to public lands were to remain in force, 36 STAT. 443 (I910), 48 U. S. C. § 664
(1940), but the Territory's power of conveyance of public lands was restricted as td
size of tracts, citizenship of grantees, and other details. 36 STAT. 444 et seq. (I9IO),
48 U. S. C. § 663 et seq. (1940). Nothing is said of the adjudication of title to lands
in dispute where a Gov't claim appears. The laws of Hawaii gave jurisdiction of such
applications for registration of title to the Land Court, providing further that Land
Court decrees should be conclusive upon the world, including the Territory. Rev. Laws
Haw. 1905, c. 154, § 2431; It Re Rosenbledt, 24 Haw. 298, 307 (1918). Where a
public claim appeared, notice to the Att'y General of the Territory was required. § 2425.
In the instant case this was done, and the Territory by its Att'y General disclaimed
title. The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed a similar adjudication of title in It Re
Title of Kioloku, 25 Haw. 357 (1920). But where the United States, under direction
of the President pursuant to 31 STAT. 141 (1900), 48 U. S. C. § 511 (1940), had taken
land for its use, the Land Court denied jurisdiction in itself unless the United States
submitted to suit. Land Title, Kalena, 34 Haw. 93 (I92O). This situation appears to
be distinguishable, for the United States had taken the land from the Territory's con-
trol before the suit. If, upon claim of interest in itself, the United States may upset
properly issued Land Court decrees of long standing, the policy should be to disfavor
such action in the interest of security of titles.
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ground for extending the policy announced by the Supreme Court in the
Carino case: 10 "Every presumption is and ought to be against the Govern-
ment in a case like the present." I'
Anti-Trust Law-Cement Industry-Legality of Multiple Basing-
,Point Pricing System-Defendant Cement Institute, cement pro-
ducers, and individuals petitioned Circuit Court to set aside F. T. C.'s
order to cease and desist from carrying out conspiracy to use multiple
basing-point price system.' Held (one judge dissenting), order vacated;
no combination to use such system has been clearly found; individual sales
at prices determined according to the system violate neither Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act,2 nor Section 2 of the Clayton Act as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.' Aetna Portland Cement Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 157 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946).
The multiple basing-point price system has been described as one by
which ". . . the delivered price at any location shall be the lowest com-
bination of base price plus all-rail freight. Thus, if mill A has a base
price of $I.5O per barrel, its delivered price at each location where it sells
cement will be $1.50 per barrel plus the all-rail freight from its mill to the
point of delivery, except that when a sale is made for delivery at a location
at which the combination of the base-price plus all-rail freight from another
mill is a lower figure, mill A uses this lower combination so that its
delivered price at such location will be the same as the delivered price of
the other mill." 4 Such price uniformity has long been incident to the
cement industry.' Agreement to maintain uniform prices at fixed levels
io. Carino v. Insular Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 212 U. S. 449, 46o (igog).
ii. The Fullard-Leos faid $15,OOO for seven-eighths of the island area in 1922.
Since the Navy will probably retain the island for its use, the practical effect of this
protracted litigation will be to determine whether the defendants will be reimbursed
from the Torrens assurance fund, provided to compensate for loss due to erroneously
issued Land Court titles, or by eminent domain proceedings.
i. In the Matter of the Cement Institute et a[., 37 F. T. C. 87 (943).
2. 38 STAT. 719 (I914), 15 U. S. C. §45 (1940). "Unfair methods of competition
in commerce . . . are hereby declared unlawful."
3. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (194o), as amended by 49 STAT. 1526
(936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1940). "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers . . . where the
effect .. . may be . . . to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any per-
son who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." The
court did affirm that the collection of "phantom freight" by non-base mills from their
local customers was an unlawful discrimination. ' Instant case at 558.
4. In the Matter of the Cement Institute, 37 F. T. C. 87, 147 (1943). The Insti-
tute disseminates freight rates to all concerned. Id. at 162 et seq. Producers ascer-
tain each others' prices through common customers and salesmen in the field. Id. at
178. The system has been criticized as one which promotes cross-hauling, inefficient
location of plants, and the construction of excessive plant capacity, with consequent
increase in expense to consumers. See Hearings before the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee, Part 5, P. 1894.
5. See Cement Manufacturers Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588
(1925) [identity of prices held the result of competition and, therefore, not unlawful un-
der the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (I8go), 15 U. S. C. § I (1940)1 ; F. T. C. ANNUAL
REPORT (933) at 58. The characteristic of uniformity of different sellers' prices at
any given point is to be distinguished from that of uniformity of a given seller's price
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has been stated to be illegal under the Sherman Act.
6 Such agreement
would then, a fortiori, appear illegal under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.7 Aside from the question of whether agreement to peg
uniform cement prices at fixed levels had been proved before the Com-
mission, the instant court questioned the sufficiency with which it had
even been proved that the uniformity itself was the result of agreement
or conspiracy between producers. 8 Such skepticism finds ample support
in the fact that, the product being standardized, price uniformity appears
inevitable in the industry.9 However, even assuming that price uniformity
is inevitable, the existence of an illegal agreement to maintain such uni-
form prices at fixed levels is nevertheless possible. Whether it was suffi-
ciently proved is doubtful. Proof of conspiracy to adopt the instant price
system does not in itself constitute proof of conspiracy to maintain fixed
price levels. It is submitted that fixed price levels are not a necessary con-
sequence of the system. Inducement for unilateral base price reduction is
present to a degree approximating that which would exist were f. o. b.
pricing the custom in the industry. By lowering his base price, any pro-
ducer can (a) expand the area within which other producers must meet
his price in order to sell, and (b) cause a corresponding contraction of
the area within which competitors can profitably meet his price. Indeed,
if the reduction in base price be incident to reduced cost of manufacture,
the efficient producer will even succeed in (c) contracting the areas within
which his competitor's base price will prevail, and (d) expanding the
area within which that base price can profitably be met.'0 Can more be
at different points. Absorption of freight for the latter purpose has been said not to
constitute discrimination within the meaning of the Clayton Act as amended. See Fed-
eral Trade Comm. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 757 (1945).
6. See Cement Manufacturers Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588,
604, 605 (1925).
7. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), i5 U. S. C. § 45 (1940). In this connection see Federal
Trade Comm. v. Beech Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 453 (1922).
8. Instant case at 557 et seq. The court appears to have relied inter alla upon the
novel proposition that no conspiracy exists unless each of the alleged conspirators pos-
sesses the power to prevent each of his comrades from executing the latter's role in
the common plan. See instant case at 558. Regarding proof of agreement to adhere
to the instant system, the Commission appears to be on solid ground. Evidence di-
rectly proving agreement between producers is not essential to proof of conspiracy.
"Singular" unanimity of action where diversity would follow from lack of agreement
has been held sufficient. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. U. S., 3o6 U. S. 208, 222, 223
(1939). See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 1125, 1139
(1946) ; Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., i42 F. (2d) 321, 331 (C. C. A.
7th, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 73o (i944).
9. He who charges one cent more than his competitor, sells no cement. In the
Matter of the Cement Institute, 37 F. T. C. 87, 250 (i943). Such being the situation,
the reduced cost to dealers resultant at any point from any producer's decrease in mill
net must be met by a corresponding cut in the price of those of his competitors who
remain in the field. This appears true whether the industry sells f. o. b. or on multiple
basing-points.
io. Two diagrams will serve to illustrate the point. In the first diagram, A and
B are competing mills connected by rail. X, Y, and Z are points spaced along the line
at $ .25 freight-rate intervals from each other, the rate both from A to X and from
B to Z also being $ .25. P is a point located midway between X and Y. P1 is a point
located midway between Y and Z. Ab initio, A's cost is $ .75, his base price $i.OO.
B's cost is $ .50,-his base price $ .75. Both mills adhere to tile multiple basing-point
price system. Accordingly, (a) B must absorb freight in order to meet A's price only
at points west of P; (b) B can profitably do so at all points east of X. Conversely,
(c) A must absorb freight at all points east of P, and (d) cannot profitably do so at
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said of f. o. b. pricing? 1 Whether or not the defendant producers have
conspired to maintain prices at fixed levels would, therefore, appear to
depend less upon their mere adherence to the instant system than upon
their alleged failure within the system actually to permit fluctuations in
price levels.12 The Commission's findings on this are meagre.' 3
With regard to alleged discriminatory pricing in violation of the
Clayton Act, the court excused the discrimination as not having been
between competing purchasers.14 Furthermore, the discrimination was
viewed as a meeting of lower prices in "good faith" 15 within the meaning
of the statute's rebuttal provision. 6 The question of whether the instant
any point east of Y. (Waste througli cross-hauling clearly results at points between X
and Y.)
(A) Cost plusfreight $ .75 1.00 I.I2/" 1.25 1.37Y2 1.50 1.75 (A)
(A) Base price plus
or minus freight $I.OO 1.25 1.373/2 1.25 I.I2Y/2 1.00 .75 (A)
A X P Y P1  Z B(B) $I.O0 1.25 1.37Y24 1.25 1.12%/ 1.00 .75 Basepriceplus (B)
or minus freight
(B) $1.50 1.25 i.I2% 1.00 .873/ .75 .50 Costplusfreight(B)
Should A succeed in reducing his cost to $ .25 and his base price to $ .50, the
altered sales picture would be reflected by the following diagram: (a) B must now
absorb freight in order to meet A's price at all points west of PI; (b) B cannot now
profitably do so at any point west of Y. Conversely, (c) A must now absorb freight
only at points east of PL, and (d) can profitably do so at all points west of Z.
(A) Cost plus freight $ .25 .50 .62a .75 .87Y2 1.00 1.25 (A)
(A) Base price plus
or minus freight $ .50 .75 .87Y2 I.00 I.12/ 1.00 .75 (A)
A X P Y P1 Z B
(B) $ .50 .75 .873/ 1.06 I.i23a 1.00 .75 Base price plus (B)
or minus freight
(B) $1.50 1.25 1.123/ 1.00 .87% .75 .5oCostplusfreight(B)
ii. See diagrams supra note io. If A and B, ab initio, sold f. o. b., the situation
before A reduced his costs would be such that A could not sell at any point east of P,
while B could not sell at any point west of P. (Note well that cross-hauling would
be nonexistent.) After A had reduced his costs, the dividing line would simply move
from P to P 1 , a distance precisely equal to that traversed in the hypothesized case of
multiple basing-point pricing. It is true that dealers, under the multiple basing-point
price system, have no choice but to accept one of several identical bids (except
during levelling-out periods incident to price reductions). See (1946) Basing-Point
Pricing and Anti-Trist Policy, 55 YAE L. J. 558, 565; cf. Milk and Ice Cream Can
Institute v. Federal Trade Comm., 152 F. (2d) 478, 480, 481 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945) sug-
gesting that price competition, though not eliminated, may thus be seriously impaired.
However, it is submitted that, under f. o. b. pricing, dealers would have no choice
whatever (except during similar levelling-out periods). See instant case at 557.
12. In one respect the instant system itself appears malignant. Under the system,
a base mill, by raising its base price, actually drives up the price which other producers
will charge within the former mill's remaining area of freightwise advantage. For
authority that adherence to a system involving such price characteristics constitutes
evidence of conspiracy to maintain high prices, see Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm., 156 F. (2d) 899, 9o6 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946).
13. See In the Matter of the Cement Institute, 37 F. T. C. 87, 253 (1943).
14. Instant case at 572. The court found it "difficult to discern how there could
be any competition, for instance, between purchasers of cement in Chicago and those
in Kansas City." Quaere, whether, all other things being equal, large scale building
will not flow to the city with the cheaper cement? "It is to be observed that § 2 (a)
does not require a finding that the discriminations in price have in fact had an adverse
effect on competition. . . . It is enough that they 'may' have the prescribed effect."
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 324 U. S. 726, 738 (19453.
15. Instant case at 56o.
16. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (940), as amended by 49 STAT. 1526
(1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1940). ". . . nothing . . . shall prevent a seller rebut-
ting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price . . . was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. . . ." The existence of
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system involves discrimination thus rendered lawful has been expressly
left open by the Supreme Court.17 The same high authority has declared
that no producer can rebut a charge of discrimination by proving that
freight was absorbed at distant points in order to meet prices unlawfully
established at such points by a competitor.' s Rebuttal efforts in the
instant case do not of necessity yield to such riposte.' 9 In the last analysis,
liability of each cement producer under the Clayton Act may depend upon
the reasonableness of his base price.20
Criminal Procedure-Indictments-Evidence-Appellants were
convicted in United States District Court upon an indictment charging
a single general conspiracy. Evidence showed that there were at least
five separate conspiracies involving twelve or more persons, and that only
one of the defendants could be directly linked to all of the evidence which
the prosecution was permitted to apply to each of them. On appeal held,
conviction of the one appellant linked to all of the evidence affirmed; con-
viction of the other two defendants reversed on the grounds that applica-
tion of all of the evidence to the case against them was an impairment of
substantial rights. Canella v. United States, 157 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A.
9 th, 1946).
Whether a variance between indictment and proof affects the sub-
stantial rights of the parties, or is mere harmless error, within the meaning
of § 269 of the United States Judicial Code ' is a question in which courts
good faith is a question of fact for the Commission. Federal Trade Comm. v. A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 758 (945).
17. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 324 U. S. 726, 735
(1945) (Company with plants both in Chicago and Kansas City calculated all deliv-
ered prices for glucose with reference to the Chicago base alone. In sustaining cease
and desist order the Supreme Court intimated, at 739, that the basis for holding such
system discriminatory was that "the prices . . . vary according to factors, phantom
freight or freight absorption . . . unrelated to . . . cost." 'However, said the
Court at 735, "We have no occasion to decide whether a basing-point system such as
that in the Cement case is permissible under the Clayton Act, in view of the provisions
of § 2 (b), permitting reductions in price in order to meet a competitor's equally low
price.").
i8. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 754
(1945) (Staley Co. attempted to rebut discrimination by showing that its prices had
resulted from adoption of the competitor Corn Products Refining Co.'s pricing system.
Held, for the Commission, the Court speaking of ". . . the clear Congressional purpose
not to sanction by § 2 (b) the excuse that the person charged with a violation of the
law was merely adopting a similar unlawful practice of another.").
19. See diagrams supra note io. The prices of B which A absorbed freight in
order to meet were prices in the establishment of which B absorbed no freight. Only
by circuity of reasoning may such prices of B be termed part of an unlawful system
practiced by B. Reverse circuity would lead to an opposite conclusion.
20. In Federal Trade Comm. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945) the
Court, at 757, denied the existence of "good faith" should a producer establish "such
a high factory price as always to admit of reductions in order to meet the prices of
competitors . . ." while further asserting ". . . it does not follow that respondents
may never absorb freight when their factory price plus actual freight is higher than
their competitors' price. "
I, 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), as amended by 40 STAT. II8I (igig), and 45 STAT.,54
(1928), 28 U. S. C. § 391 (Supp. 1945) : ". . . On the hearing of any appeal . . .
in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." See also 48 STAT. 1064
(934), 28 U. S. C. following § 723c (8941) ; FED. RULES CIM. PROC. 61: "No error
in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error . . . in anything
1947]
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are allowed considerable latitude. Application of this principle is fairly
simple where the variance is clearly "technical" in nature, as misspelling
a name in the indictment. In such instances, the variance will not be held
fatal so long as the indictment properly informs the defendant of the
charges, and protects him against another prosecution for the same offense.
2
It is in the conspiracy cases that the courts find difficulty in applying
§ 269.' The cases do not fall into any particular pattern where the vari-
ance between indictment and proof involves a greater or lesser number of
guilty parties, or more or fewer conspiracies. The decisions tend to move
away from the question of variance between indictment and evidence as
we trace them from the earlier cases to the more modern ones; and,
although the courts speak in terms of variances, it appears that they are
far more concerned with evidence alone. If the indictment charges one
conspiracy, and it develops on trial that two or more existed, and that the
one charged is not established to the clear exclusion of the others proven,
the variance has been held to be fatal. 4 The converse of the situation in
these cases is that in which two or more conspiracies are proved, one of
which is identified as the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. In
such a case, the variance is not fatal as against those defendants shown
to be guilty of the conspiracy identified.5 This would indicate that suffi-
ciency of proof, rather than variance, is the chief concern of the courts.
Where the variance is fatal, it is generally so held because the evidence
linking one defendant to a given conspiracy is applied in such a fashion
as Imight tend to confuse the jury into believing that all of the defendants
are equally guilty. In the Marcante case, the court stated that "the prac-
tice of submitting to a jury, in one trial, the question of the guilt or
innocence of thirty or fifty citizens, where the testimony as to each is
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for . . . disturbing
a judgment . . . unless refusal to take such action appears to the'court inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court . . . must disregard any error.or defect which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Compare with Fmn. RuIEs CRIM.
Poc. 52 (a) (1946).
2. In Bennett v. United States, 227 U. S. 333, 338 (1913) the Supreme Court said:lf the essential thing in the requirement of correspondence between the,allegation
of the name of the woman transported and the proof is that the record be in such shape
as to inform the defendant of the charge and to protect her against another prosecu-
tion for the same offense." See also Valli v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A.
Ist, 1938) ; Myers v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) ; Haywood v.
United States, 268 Fed. 795 (C. C. A. 7th, 192o) ; Harrison v. United States, 2oo Fed.
662 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. VI provides: "... the accused shall be fully and plainly
informed of the character and cause of the accusation... !'
3. 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), as amended by o STAT. 1181 (i919), and 45 STAT. 54
(1928), 28 U. S. C. § 391 (Supp. 1945), UNrraD STATES JUDIcIAL CODE § 269, quoted
supra note 2.
4. United States v. Siebricht, 59 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; Marcante v.
United States, 49 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. ioth, 193) ; United States v. Wills, 36 F.
(2d) 855 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929) ; Wyatt v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1928) ; Terry v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Tinsley v. United
States, 43 F. (2d) 89o (C. C. A. ioth, 1931) ; accord, United States v. Beck, 118 F.
(2d) I78, 182 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; Telman v. United States, 67 F. (2d) 716, 718 (C.
C. A. ioth, 1933).
5. Parnell v. United Staes, 64 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. loth, 1933) ; accord, United
States v. Rosenberg, i5o F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). In Hardy v. United States,
256 Fed. 284 (C. C. A. 5th, IWO1) the court said: "Failure to connect all of the de-
fendants with the conspiracy charged is not a fatal variance as against the guilty de-
fendants." Cf. United States v. Liss, 137 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) (Where
one conspiracy was charged, and two were proven, the variance, while not fatal, was
not necessarily harmless).
different, is not to be encouraged." 6 The conclusion that there is safety
in numbers is tempting here.7  Again, is it in fact the variance which
worries the court in such a situation, or is it the difficulty of separating
the evidence according to the activities of the individual defendants? In
the instant case, the defendant Canella was the central figure in a number
of conspiracies involving at least twelve people; and, although the indict-
ment charged only one conspiracy, his conviction was affirmed. On the
other hand, defendants Wyckoff and McCormac were actively engaged in
only one of the conspiracies. To apply all of the evidence against Canella
to the prosecution of the other two defendants was, in the opinion of the
circuit court, something more than harmless error. True, it was error;
but, was the evidence relating solely to that conspiracy in which Vyckoff
and McCormac participated insufficient to sustain a conviction? s The
court placed the instant case somewhere between two previous cases in-
volving similar situations. In the first, Berger v. United States,' convic-
tion was upheld where only some of the defendants were proved to be
involved, and where one conspiracy was charged, and two were proven.
But, each conspiracy established fitted the charges in the indictment and
each was participated in by some of the defendants; hence the court held
that one defendant, shown by the evidence to be involved in only one of
the two conspiracies, had no grounds for complaint since his substantial
rights were not impaired by the variance. At the opposite pole is the
other case, Kotteakos v. United States,' where the defendant was indicted
for a single conspiracy, and convicted upon evidence showing the involve-
ment of at least thirty-two defendants in no less than eight separate con-
spiracies. The burden of defending a person connected with only one
transaction involved in the complicated structure of the prosecution's evi-
dence was deemed to be far greater than when only two transactions were
involved as in the Berger case. "The sheer difference in numbers, both
of defendants and of conspiracies proven" was the basis of the distinction
made by the Supreme Court between the Berger and Kotteakos cases 11
The court, in referring to the number of persons and conspiracies involved,
finds a niche for the instant case, "somewhere between the Berger and
K'otteakos cases." Why this niche is large enough to accommodate only
Canella, and not Wyckoff and McCormac, is difficult to see. If it is be-
6. Marcante v. United States, 49 F. (2d) 156, 158 (C. C. A. ioth, Ig3i), cited
supra note 4.
7. Obviously, the courts must try to find some concrete basis for distinguishing
between a variance which impairs substantial rights, and one which is harmless error.
The most popular method is to weigh the number of conspiracies, the number of de-
fendants, and the volume of evidence against the ability of the jury to understand the
problem. When the combination of these elements appears too complicated for com-
prehension by a jury of laymen, courts are likely to find the variance fatal except as
against those defendants so clearly connected to all of the evidence that their guilt
cannot be doubted. Query, whether continued application of this method might not
lead to the resolution of cases upon the basis of arithmetical progressions rather than
rules of law?
S. Manton v. United States, lO7 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) (Where co
defendant was not criminally connected with the general conspiracy, but with a sepa-
rate conspiracy, it was ruled that there was not a fatal variance. Proof relating to
the conspiracy with which the co-defendant was not connected could be disregarded as
incompetent with respect to him, and the jury was instructed to weigh only evidence
relating to the co-defendant in passing upon the question of his innocence or guilt).
9. 295 U. S. 78 (1935) ; accord, United States v. Cohen, 145 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A.
2d, 1944), and Marino v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). The
Berger case is noted in (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 515.
io. 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946).
II. Kotteakos v. United States, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1246 (1946).
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cause of the variance between pleading and proof, why was this variance
not fatal as to Canella as well? (Or, was it because the evidence relating
only to the conspiracy involving Wyckoff and McCormac was insufficient
to sustain the conviction?) If the difficulty is that of confusion of evi-
dence, the shortcut of mass prosecution should not be undertaken when
the danger of backfire is so great. Why not weed out the extraneous
evidence beforehand, and try each defendant individually? Or, if this is
not practical, why not try the case on the same theory as that used in the
Manton case? '
2
Criminal Procedure-New Trial-Effect of Action of Circuit
Court of Appeals on Motion for New Trial-The United States peti-
tioned in the circuit court of appeals for writs of mandamus and prohibition
directed to the judges of a federal district court requiring them to vacate
'an order granting a new trial to accused. The order for a new trial was
entered after affirmance by the circuit court of the district court's judgment
of conviction and denial of motion for a new trial.' Held, petition denied.
2
Rule 33- of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not impose any
time limit upon the power of the trial judge to grant a new trial upon
consideration of a timely motion.8 Once a motion for a new trial has
been properly filed the district court may exercise its discretion with
respect thereto regardless of affirmation on appeal of a prior ruling deny-
ing the motion. United States v. Smith, 156 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1946).,
Where no appeal has been taken after conviction it has been generally
held that a trial judge could reconsider his ruling denying a motion for a
new trial. 4 After a judgment has been affirmed or an appeal denied on
12. Manton v. United States, IO7 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cited supra
note 8.
i. John Memolo, the accused, was convicted for wilfully attempting to evade in-
come taxes, and conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Memolo, 152
F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1946), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 9o2 (1946). On April 4,
1946, the circuit court issued its mandate to the district court affirming the judgment.
Memolo was taken into custody. He was released April 9, 1946, on receipt of an order
from the trial judge granting a new trial. The order stated that the trial judge had
reconsidered the grounds urged in support of the motion and that in the interest of
justice a new trial should be granted. Memolo intervened in the petition proceedings
as an interested party. Instant case at 643.
2. The court was divided in its decision, two of the five judges dissenting. Certi-
orari has been granted by the Supreme Court. 15 U. S. L. WEEK 3171 (1946),
Docket No. 498.
3. The trial court was governed by the new FED. RuLEs OF CnMt. PROC., IS U. S.
C. § 687 (2946). Rule 33 is as follows: "New Trial. The Court may grant a new
trial to a defendant if required in the interest of justice. If trial was by the court
without a jury the court may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony
and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground
of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final
judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand
of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made
within 5 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court
may fix during the 5-day period."
4. Cases upholding the power of the trial court to reconsider its ruling are: Hef-
ton v. State, 2o6 Ind. 663, 19o N. E. 847 (1934) ; People v. Beath, 277 Mich. 473, 269
N. W. 238 (1936) ; Dimriiel v. State, 128 Neb. 191, 258 N. W. 271 (1935). Contra,
People v. Paysen, 123 Cal. App. 396, 11 P. (2d) 431 (1932) ; State v. Lubosky, 59 R. I.
493, 196 Atl. 395 (1938). In the state courts this power to reconsider is generally
limited to the term at which the motion is made. Rule 45 (c) of the FED. RULES OF
CRIM. PRoc., provides that the expiration of a term of court in no way affects the
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its merits by the appellate court it has generally been held in the federal
courts that the trial court cannot thereafter entertain a motion for a new
trial without the permission of the appellate court.6 The federal rule prior
to the enactment of the present rules of procedure provided that the trial
court could not reconsider a motion unless new evidence was introduced 6
and that, othervise, the trial court had no authority to entertain a motion
for a new trial but must conform to the mandate in further proceedings.7
The majority of the court in the instant case ruled that the issue before
them on appeal was whether or not the trial judge had abused his discre-
tion in denying a new trial." Having found he had not, they necessarily
affirmed the decision. The court said, in interpreting the Federal Rules
of Criminal 'Procedure, that the judge was not limited as to time in
exercising his discretion on the question of ordering a new trial.9 He
was, then, not disobeying a mandate but merely acting properly outside
its scope.10 That the trial court may reconsider the motion without new
evidence, as in the instant case, after the appellate court has held that
there was no abuse of discretion in denying A new trial, does not seem
to have been contemplated by those who formulated these rules." The
first sentence of Rule 33, which states that "The court may grant a new
trial to the defendant if required in the interests of justice," would seem
to be limited by the sentences following which provide that a motion for
a new trial based on the ground of "newly discovered evidence may be
made only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an
appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the
case." 12 The words of the first sentence, when considered with those
following, do not appear to confer independent power upon the courts
but rather to establish a standard for their guidance in granting new trials
upon proper motions. Furthermore, the rules contain no provision au-
thorizing a court to grant a new trial after a remand except on the ground
power of a court to do any act in a criminal proceeding. Some courts have held that
a trial court cannot set aside a sentence and appoint a new trial after the defendant
has been committed to prison, regardless of error at the trial. See People ex rel.
Lucey v. Turney, 273 Ill. 546, 113 N. E. io5 (1916) ; Commonwealth v. Sacco, 261
Mass. 12, 158 N. E. i67, cert. denied, 275 U. S. 574 (1927).
5. See Murphy v. City of Orlando, 94 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 5th, i938) ; Flowers
v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) ; Swartz v. Kaplan, 5o F. (2d)
947 (App. D. C. 1931). For an exhaustive treatment of the general subject see Note
(1942) 139 A. L. R. 34o.
6. Rule 2 of the old FED. RULEs OF Cam!. PRoc., i8 U. S. C. § 688 (1934) provided
that ". . . a motion for a new trial solely upon the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence may be made within sixty (6o) days after final judgment . . . unless an ap-
peal has been taken and in that event the trial court may entertain the motion only on
remand of the case by the appellate court for that purpose, and such remand may be
made at any time before final judgment."
7. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 3o7 U. S. i6i (i939); Mays v. Burgess,
152 F. (2d) 123 (App. D. C. I945). -
8. Instant case at 646. In Crenshaw v. United States, ii6 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940), it was held that "the denial of a motion for a new trial is not reviewable
except for an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion."
9. Instant case at 644.
io. See Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 3o7 U. S. i6i (1939), wherein it was
held that a mandate is controlling as to matters within its compass, but on the remand
a lower court is free as to other issues. Also see In re Sanford Fork and Tool Co.,
I6o U. S. 247 (1895), and Ex parte French, 91 U. S. 423 (1875).
ii. There is no doubt that a trial judge should realize better than anyone else
whether or not a new trial should be granted in the interests of justice. The question
presented here is whether he should be able to reconsider the same motion after an
appeal has been taken and judgment has been affirmed, the appellate court having ruled
that there had been no abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a new trial.
12. Note 3 s pra.
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of newly discovered evidence.' 3 It does not seem to have been intended
that the district court would have power to exercise its discretion in order-
ing a new trial regardless of an appeal.' 4 To grant a trial judge of a
district court this power would seem to be a revolutionary reform, ih that
the trial judge in effect would be given appellate power superior to both
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.15  The instant decision, there-
fore, does not appear to be consistent with a reasonable interpretation of
Rule 33. To. give proper effect to the intentions of those who formulated
the rule, its application should be limited to those situations where no
appeal has been taken.' 6
Enemy Alien-Termination of War-Unconditional Surrender-
A German national, interned as an enemy alien since 1939 by order of
the Executive Government of Great Britain acting within its 'discretionary
authority on behalf of the King, applied for a writ of habeas corpus after
Germany's unconditional sdrrender in 1945 claiming he was no longer an
enemy alien because Germany, having no independent government, had
ceased to exist as a State and could not, therefore, be at war with Great
Britain. A certificate from the Foreign Secretary was produced, which
stated, inter alia, that a state of war still existed between his Majesty and
Germany.' Held, his Majesty's pronouncement that Great Britain was
13. FED. RuLEs OF Cium. Paoc., i8 U. S. C. § 687 (1946).
14. Mr. George H. Dession, a member of the United States Supreme Court Ad-
visory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, stated that, "The rules work no
revolutionary reforms. Some restate existing law. Others involve substantial changes.
By and large those changes consist in adoption of modern practices developed in the
more progressive states and in England. A few are new. The prime values sought to
be served throughout were, as declared in Rule 2, 'simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." Dession, The
New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:x (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 694, 699.
15. The trial judge, although the appellate court had decided there was no abuse
of discretion, could always grant a new trial in the "interests of justice." The power
of the appellate court would be nullified, and its determinations rendered worthless.
i6. Query: Did those who formulated Rule 33 intend that the power granted a
judge exist indefinitely where there was no appeal? judge Biggs, in his dissenting
opinion of the instant case, footfiote 6, points out that it might be argued plausibly
that ". . . no appeal being taken, a trial judge might reconsider a motion for a new
trial filed by a convicted defendant and grant it after the defendant had served, let us
say, three years of a five year sentence. Under such circumstances it might be neces-
sary to hold that the source of the motion was spent after the lapse of a reasonable
time. "
i. The certificate from Mr. Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated
April 2, 1946, states as follows:
"(i) That under par. 5 of the preamble to the declaration, dated Junre 5, 1945,
of the unconditional surrender of Germany, the Governments of the United King-
dom, the United States of America, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and
France assumed 'supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the
powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command, and any State,
municipal or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes
stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of
Germany.'
"(2) That, in consequence of this declaration, Germany still exists as a State
and German nationality as a nationality, but the Allied Control Commission are'
the -agency through which the government of Germany is carried on.
"(3) That, no treaty of peace or declaration by the Allied Powers having
been made terminating the state of war with Germany, his Majesty is still in a
state of war with Germany, although, as provided in the declaration of surrender,
all active hostilities have ceased."
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still at war was conclusive as to questions of law or fact and the state of
war could only be ended by his Majesty's making peace; a writ of habeas
corpus would not lie at the instance of an interned enemy alien. Rex v.
Bottrill; ex parte Kuechenneister, 62 T. L. R. 570 (Ct. of App. 1946).
The great weight of American authority coincides with the instant
case in holding that it is the province of the Government and not the
Courts to determine when a state of war has terminated.2  A mere cessa-
tion of hostilities 3 is generally incapable of effecting the legal conse-
quences - that ordinarily follow official recognition of war's end by an
executive proclamation or a duly ratified treaty of peace.6 In the United
2. Bowles v. Ormesher Bros., 65 F. Supp. 79i (D. C. D. Neb. 1946) ; Dubuisson v.
Simmons, 26 So. (2d) 438 (Fla. 1946) ; Conley, et al. v. Sup'rs Calhoun Co., 2 W. Va.
416 (868). See Kneeland-Bigelow Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 207 Mich. 546, 550,
174 N. W. 6o5, 6o8 (igig), "The existence of war and the restoration of peace are de-
termined by action of the legislative, supplemented by the executive, department of gov-
ernment. Such determination is conclusive and binding upon the courts." COOLEY, CON-
STITUOioNAL LAw (4th ed. 1931) p. i8o: "Over political questions the courts have no
authority, but must accept the determination of the political departments of the gov-
ernment as conclusive. Such are the questions of the existence of war, the restoration
of peace. . . ." Cf. Nelson v. Manning, 53 Ala. 549, 552 (1875), where the court in-
timated that for purposes of enforcing a promissory note, conditioned for payment
after "peace is concluded and declared . .. ," they could regard the cessation of hostil-
.ities as having terminated the Civil War without looking to decisions of the political
department of the government.
3. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. I (1920) (prohibition in 92nd Article of War of
trial by court-martial for murder "in time of peace," held not invoked by cessation of
hostilities before officially declared "peace") ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.,
251 U. S. 146 (1919) (application of Wartime Prohibition Act); Hijo v. United
States, 194 U. S. 315 (1904) (Cuban vessel seized by the United States for use during
Spanish-American War) ; Lloyd v. Bowring, 36 T. L. R. 397 (K. B. 192o) (contract
to pay a given sum if peace not declared by specified date).
4- In 3 HvnE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1945) § 921, the following effects
of termination of war resulting from principles of international law, are listed: Sub-
sequent warlike acts become illegal; obligation arises to remove forces from adver-
sary's territory, to restore his prisoners of war, and to release interned enemy aliens;
diplomatic relations may be resumed; the obligation under contracts between nationals
of the former belligerents that had been suspended by war, is revived; impediments
barring maintenance of actions by persons previously enemy aliens are removed; com-
munication of intelligence and commercial intercourse between territories of the former
belligerents becomes permissible.
Illustrative of actions wherein running of the statute of limitations was suspended
until end of the war because the parties were nationals of opposing belligerents, are:
The Protector, 12 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1871) (time for appealing judgment) ; Koswig v.
Ellison & Sons, 89 Pa. Super. 208 (1926) (action on contract for goods sold) ; Sip-
lyak v. Davis, 276 Pa. 49, i19 At. 745 (1923) (action for damages under workmen's
compensation statute).
Concerning removal of enemy status by termination of war see Zimmerman v.
Hicks, 7 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Clemens v. Perry, 5I S. W. (2d) 267 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1932).
See Adams, Legal Effects of Termination of War (1945) 275 INs. L. J. 663.
5. The American Civil War was generally recognized as having terminated upon
presidential proclamation that the rebellion had been suppressed in the several southern
states: McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426 (188o) ; The Protector, 12 Wall. 700
(U. S. 1871) ; United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56 (U. S. 1869).
6. Ratification in April 1899 of the treaty with Spain ended the Spanish-American
War: Herrera Nephews v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 430 (19o8); Hijo v. United
States, 194 U. S. 315 (1904). For purposes of municipal law, World War I was gen-
erally considered to have ended with the President's approval of Congressional Procla-
mation of July 2, 1921 (later reinforced by the treaty) : Zimmerman v. Hicks, 7 F.
(2d) 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Clemens v. Perry, 51 S. W. (2d) 267 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1932) ; British courts held the date to be that of exchange of ratifications be-
tween belligerents: Kotzias v. Tyser, 36 T. L. R. 194 (K. B. 192o) ; Lloyd v. Bowring,
36 T. L. R. 397 (K. B. 1920).
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States, delay in preparing a treaty and bitter disagreement between Presi-
dent Wilson and the Senate deferred formal .termination of World War I
for almost three years from the cessation of hostilities by armistice.
7 Dur-
ing that time there was some relaxation of restrictions governing inter-
course and communication with the enemys and a few courts decided to
accept less formal statements by the President as evidence of the war's
end for limited purposes.9 The question of whether World War II was
"terminated" by official Allied announcements of unconditional surrender
of the former Axis nations,'0 has already inspired considerable litiga-
tion; 1 while the wranglings of the victorious powers postpone final dis-
position of treaty matters, many more cases of this type may be an-
ticipated. How shall the courts treat them? Can the traditional test of
looking only to a treaty or formal executive proclamation properly be
applied? Obviously, the situation today differs materially from that which
followed the 1918 Armistice. The fact that the vanquished powers sur-
rendered unconditionally merits more than passing attention. There is
some basis in international law for construing the unconditional sur-
render instrument itself as essentially a treaty, whereby the surrendering
nation agrees to both military and political capitulation, thus effectively
terminating the war. 2  Such reasoning is particularly applicable to the
case of Germany, as distinguished from the other Axis states,' 3 for she
7. The Armistice was effective November i, i918. In May of 192o the President
vetoed a joint congressional resolution pronouncing the war at an end. On March 3,
1921, his last day in office, President Wilson approved a joint resolution naming that
day as the termination date but excepting certain statutes. Finally on July 2, 1921, a
broader resolution declaring the war "at an end" was approved by President Harding
and when ratifications of the Treaty were exchanged with Germany on November II,
1921, the President proclaimed that the war had ended on July 2nd of that year. See
Hudson, The Duration of the War Betwqen the United States and Germany (1926)
39 H.Av. L. REv. io2o.
8. See 3 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2388; Hudson, supra note 7, at 1032.
9. United States v. Hicks, 256 Fed. 707 (W. D. Ky. igig), where an act, author-
izing suppression of disorderly houses around encampments "during the present war"
was held inapplicable to an offence committed after November ii, I918. On that date
President Wilson, before a joint session of Congress had said, "The war thus comes to
an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will be impossible for the
German command to renew it" In United States v. Switzer, 6 Alaska 223 (1920),
the court looked to the same presidential statement and decided that a 1917 statute
making -it a criminal offence to utter language disrespectful and contemptuous of the
flag in time of war, was inapplicable to utterances made after November ii, 1918.
Jennings, J., said: ". . . it is idle to contend that simply because no treaty has been
signed, the country is still at war."
io. Such statements as the following have been considered: The United Nations'
declaration at Berlin, June 5, 1945, announcing Germany's unconditional surrender
(U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 1944-45); the
proclamation by President Truman on May 8, 1945, to the effect that the allied armies
had wrung from Germany a final and unconditional surrender and a similar proclama-
tion on August I6, 1945, relating to the Japanese surrender (U. S. NAvAL WAR COL-
LEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 1944-45). In his message to Congress on Sep-
tember 6, 1945, the President said, inter alia, "The end of the war came more swiftly
than most of us anticipated" (CONGRESs.ioNAL REcoRD of that day).
II. Citizens Protective League v. Byrnes, 64 F. Supp. 233 (D. D. C. 1946) (action
to restrain deportation of German nationals); Bowles v. Soverinsky, 65 F. Supp.
8o8 (E. D. Mich. 1946) (violation of Price Control Act) ; The Elqui, 62 F. Supp. 764
(E. D. N. Y. 1945), noted in (1946) 2o TUILANE L. REv. 44o (Chilean retention of
Danish vessel requisitioned for the "duration of the present European war") ; In re
Cooper [1946] Ch. io9, 62 T. L. R. 65 (substitute provisions in will conditioned on
heirs surviving "present war").
12. See Balling, Unconditional Surrender and a Unilateral Declaration of Peace
(1945) 39 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 474; (945) 89 SOL. J. 484.
13. (945) 89 SOL. J. 322, 323, points out that the case of Germany is different
from that of Italy and the European satellites of the Axis, because each of those states
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has been completely stripped of independent sovereignty and her territory
carved into four separate governmental units controlled by Allied com-
manders. Consequently there appears to be no German "State" with which
we might arrange a formal treaty of peace, nor any responsible func-
tionaries to represent her. The solution, it is submitted, to the problem
of establishing a date of termination of World War II for purposes of
municipal law, may well lie with the legislature. New Zealand has, by
legislative action,14 adopted a policy which leaves to the discretion of the
courts the proper construction of war-termination phrases in contracts,
deeds and other instruments. As early as September 7, 1945, President
Truman submitted to Congress an opinion of the Attorney General sug-
gesting measures that might be taken with regard to terminating wartime
statutes. 15 Similar action might well be directed toward removing war-
time limitations on private contractual relationships.
Insurance-Disability Clause-Alcoholism-Plaintiff was the
beneficiary of two life insurance policies issued to her husband, which
provided for waiver of premiums and payment of monthly benefits in the
event that the insured became totally and permanently disabled. A clause
provided that "disability payments shall not be granted if disability is the
result of self-inflicted injury." The husband began drinking excessively
in 1937 and became totally disabled due to chronic alcoholism in 1942.
The beneficiary sued the insurance company for the waiver and benefits
under the disability clause. The trial court, in a non-jury trial, gave
judgment for the insurance company on the general ground that chronic
alcoholism is a self-inflicted injury. Upon appeal held affirmed.- Lynch
v. Mutml Life Insurance Co. of N. Y., 159 Pa. Super. 488, 48A. (2d)
877 (1946).2
has retained a government with manifest legal continuity since pre-war days, so that
there exists a potential contracting party with whom an old-fashioned treaty of peacemay be concluded. See 3 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2391, to the effect that recourse
to a treaty of peace as a method of terminating war implies in the case of each contract-
ing party a continuance of State life as well as a freedom of power to exact or yield
such terms as it deems expedient.
14. As reported in (1945) 21 NEw ZEALAND L. J. 197, § x6 of the FINANCE AcT of
1945 provides that for purposes of any act or regulation referring to the duration or
termination of the present war, the war shall be deemed to exist until a date to be
named as the date of termination of the war by the Governor-General. It should be
noted that this act does not mention contracts, deeds, oi other instruments. Cf. TER-
MINATION OF THE PRESENT WAR (DEFINITION) AcT (8 & 9 GFo. V, c. 59) adopted by
Great Britain in i918. This gave his Majesty in Council the power to set a date that
would be treated as the date of termination of any statutes as well as any contracts,
deeds, or other instruments (except where the context otherwise required) referring in
any manner to the termination of the present war.
15. 40 Op. ATT'Y GEN. Ioo (September 1, 1945). This opinion considered some
300 statutes, regulations, articles of war, etc., and divided them into about 30 categories
with respect to time and method of their termination, some to end on specified dates,
others only upon restoration of a formal state of peace, and still others upon a formal
proclamation of the President as to the cessation of hostilities. On December 31,
1946, President Truman did officially proclaim the cessation of World War II hostili-
ties, which resulted in the immediate cancellation of 2o wartime statutes and fixed the
expiration date of 33 others. This declaration, however, specifically pointed out that
a state of war still exists. See The Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 2, 1947, p. I, col. 5.
I. The court stated that, without holding that chronic alcoholism is as a matter of
law a self-inflicted injury, the evidence justified the conclusion that in this case the in-
sured's liability was self-inflicted. Instant case at 494, 48 A. (2d) at 879 (1946).
2. Accord, Gaines v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 3o6 Mich. 192, 1o N. W. (2d) 823
(1943). Contra, N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggins, 178 Okla. 36, 6I P. (2d) 543 (1936).
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There are indications in the opinion that the court interpreted the
words "self-inflicted injury" as an injury resulting from an act done by
the insured to himself of his own free will, knowing or having reason to
know that there is a possibility that harm may result.3 This interpreta-
tion is, however, so at odds with the reasonable meaning of the term 4
that it is fair to conclude that the court followed a different interpretation:
that it is an injury similarly resulting, where the insured acts knowing
or having' reason to know that there is a high probability that substantial
harm will result.' The court, placing emphasis upon the fact that chronic
alcoholism inevitably results from continued excessive drinking, decided
arguendo that chronic alcoholism resulting from "voluntary" intoxication
is a self-inflicted injury even under the latter interpretation. The court
observed that "all men . . . know only too well the baneful and in-
evitable consequences of intemperate and unrestrained indulgence in
drink," that the insured* "discovered his vulnerability long before he
eventually succumbed." and that he nevertheless deliberately continued to
drink thereafter.6 Assuming these observations to be correct, the neces-
sary elements of the interpretation apparently adopted by the court-high
probability of harm, knowledge thereof, and an act done of the insured's
own free will-were present in this instance.
The observations quoted above seem, .however, to be of doubtful
validity. Statistics show that it is neither inevitable, nor even probable,
that an excessive drinker, will become a chronic alcoholic.7 Thus in any
case involving excessive drinking, and therefore in the instant case, it would
3. "The policies provide protection against the insured's misfortunes, not his mis-
deeds. A misdeed (is) . . . wilful identification of one's self with what is harm-
ful." Instant case at 494, 48 A. (2d) at 879 (1946). The court might have adopted
an even stricter interpretation of "self-inflicted injury," i. e., an injury resulting from
any act done by the insured to himself under any circumstances. However, the defend-
ant, trial court and appellate court all rejected this interpretation as too inclusive, and
excluded injury resulting from accident (drinking poison by mistake) or fraud or
duress on the part of another. See instant case at 492, 494, 48 A. (2d) at 878, 879
(1946) ; Record, instant case at 137a, 138a; Brief for Appellee, instant case at 12, 13.
On the other hand, the court might have adopted a more liberal interpretation, i. e.,
that it is an injury resulting where the insured did the act intending that the injury
should result. Cf. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggins, 178 Okla. 36, 61 P. (2d) 543 (1936)
(injury was not self-inflicted because, while insured intended to drink, he did not in-
tend to become an alcoholic). The disadvantages of the latter interpretation are ob-
vious. Recently there have been cases of injury caused by the playing of "Russian
Poker," i. e., where a person loads one chamber of a revolver, spins the cylinder, points
the gun at his head and pulls the trigger. If injury results (and the odds are I in 6
that it will) it seems highly doubtful that a court would permit recovery merely because
the insured did not intend the injurious result. ,
4. This interpretation seems clearly at odds with the purpose of such insurance
policies; under it, injury resulting from insured's voluntarily driving a car with due
care, whittling with a knife, or even going out in the rain, would be self-inflicted be-
causd he had reason to know of the possibility that harm might result.
5. The court expressed this interpretation by analogy to the definition of "wanton-
ness" contained in RESTATEMET, ToRTs (1934) § 500. Instant case at 492, 48 A. (2d)
at 878 (1946). The decision in other alcoholism cases has centered on this interpreta-
tion. Cf. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 174 Md. 596, igg Atl. 822
(1938) (injury was not self-inflicted because while insured intended to drink he did
not know of the potential harm therein) ; Gaines v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 306
Mich. 192, IO N. W. (2d) 823 (1943) (injury was self-inflicted because it is common
knowledge that continual excessive drinking may lead to chronic alcoholism).
6. Instant case at 493, 48 A. (2d) at 879 (1946).
7. Of the ioo million persons of drinking age in the United States, 50 million use
alcoholic beverages; of these, 3 million become excessive drinkers; and of these 750,000
become chronic alcoholics. By excessive drinkers is meant those persons who drink
to an extent which exposes them to the risk of becoming compulsive drinkers and de-
veloping chronic alcoholism. JELLINEx, THE PROBLEMS OF ALCOHOL, in ALCOHOL,
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY (Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 1945) 23. Thus
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be difficult to find the requisite high probability of harm or a knowledge
thereof. The court's determination that the insured acted- of his own free
will in continuing to drink excessively is equally questionable. The con-
clusion that he could have stopped drinking was not based upon any find-
ing by the lower court, but upon the testimony of one of defendant's wit-
nesses at the trial 8 and upon the court's belief that ordinarily intoxication
is voluntary-"they may pass into that state when they will." ' But pre-
vailing psychiatric opinion holds that in many cases of chronic alcoholism
the compulsion to drink springs originally from a psychological illness
within the drinker,10 that this compulsion may exist in him before he
realizes it," and that he may be driven to alcohol regardless of an earnest
desire to stop drinking.12  This view negatives any general conclusion
that excessive drinkers ordinarily "pass into that state when they will,"
and in fact supports the counter view that alcoholism is involuntary rather
than the result of free will in a large number of cases-and very possibly
in the instant case.
Since the medical and sociological data outlined above demonstrate
that there is not a high probability that an excessive drinker will become
a chronic alcoholic and that in many instances excessive drinking is not in
fact the result of the exercise of a free will, and since evidence concerning:
the insured's ability to stop drinking was exceedingly scanty, it is believed
that the case should have been remanded to the lower court for further
testimony and for a finding by that court concerning the insured's ability
to stop drinking. In any event, it is suggested that in light of the medical
view of chronic alcoholism, the general approach and language of the court
in the instant case should not be applied to many cases involving chronic
alcoholism as a "self-inflicted injury." 13
only 6 per cent. of those who drink, and 25 per cent. of those who drink excessively
become chronic alcoholics.
S. This witness further testified, however, that in his opinion all alcoholics could
stop drinking if they "made up their mind." Record, instant case at Ioga. For con-
trary views see notes io, ii, and 12 infra. The question as to insured's ability to stop
drinking was not asked of plaintiff's witnesses. Had they testified upon this point the
conclusion might well have been different. The lower court found that the insured
was treated for alcoholism in various hospitals from 1940 to 1942. Record, instant case
at 135a. But "ordinarily one cannot convince the incipient alcoholic that he is one."
JELLINEK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 28.
9. Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55, 58, 84 Am. Dec. 414, 416 (1863).
io. See JFLLiNEK, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 25-26; SMITH AND HELWIG, LIguoa
THE SERVANT OF MAN (1940) 183-184; CARROLL, WHAT PRICE ALCOHOL? (1941) 9;
MAYER, ALCOHOL AS A PSYCHIATRIC' PROBLEM, in ALCOHOL AND MAN (Emerson, edi-
tor, 1943) 290; and SELIGER, ALCOHOLICS ARE SICK PEOPLE (1945) 2-4. And see
Bailey v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 222 N. C. 716, 724, 24 S. E. (2d) 614, 61g (I943),
wherein the Court said: ". . . plaintiff's evidence tends to show that . . . from a
scientific point of view, whiskey-drinking is not a disease but a symptom of some dis-
ease which causes whiskey-drinking."
ii. This is sometimes known as "psychic allergy" to alcohol. See STRECKER AND
CHAMBERS, ALCOHOL-ONE MAN'S MEAT (1938) 37; CARROLL, op. cit. supra note io,
at 122; MAYER, op. cit. Stpra note io, at 293.
12. See New England Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 174 Md. 596, igg AtI. 822 (1938);
MAYER, op. cit. supra note Io, at 288. Also the following: "We think of alcoholism as
an illness;' an obsession of the mind coupled to an 'allergy' of the body. It is a shatter-
ing sickness-physical, emotional and spiritual. How to expel the obsession that com-
pels us to drink against our will is the problem of every alcoholic." ALCOHOLICS
AxONYMOUS (The Alcoholic Foundation, 1943) I.
13. It is submitted that the soundest interpretation of "self-inflicted injury" is one
involving a variable standard, based upon three elements-the social utility of the act
done, the probability of harm, and the seriousness of the potential harm. A few ex-
amples of the operation of such a standard follow:
(a) A, afflicted with heart disease, sees his wife drowning a mile from shore.
He swims to rescue her, permanently- injuring himself thereby. Recovery should
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Taxation-Family Partnership-Allocation of Income-Taxpayer
and wife executed an agreement providing for an equal distribution of
profits from the joint operation of an automobile agency previously oper-
ated by taxpayer alone. Taxpayer contributed $12,543 capital and con-
tinued to manage the business. Wife contributed $4,9oo, but exercised
no substantial control and rendered no vital services. Taxpayer made a
gift to wife of 50 per cent of the business. Held,1 not a bona fide partner-
ship for tax purposes, but a "business arrangement" in which 75 per cent of
the profits were attributable to the personal services of the taxpayer, and
therefore taxable to him; 25 per cent of the profits were attributable to
capital, and therefore taxable to the parties in proportion to their re-
spective capital contributions. Claire L. Canfield, 7 T. C. No. 107, Docket
No. 5864, Oct. II, 1946.2
This decision is distinctive in that, while refusing to recognize a
family partnership agreement for tax purposes,3 it disallows the Com-
missioner's contention that the entire income be taxed to the husband 4
and finds a "business arrangement" in which the agreement between the
parties will not dictate the basis upon which the profits of the business
are to be divided. In the past, the Tax Court has refused to apply the
allocation of income theory to family partnership cases in which the court
has recognized the partnership as such, holding that the partnership agree-
be permitted. Though the probability of serious injury to the in~ured was high,
the social utility of the act outweighs these factors.
(b) B plays "Russian Poker" on a dare (note 3 supra) and is seriously in-
jured. Recovery should be denied; though the probability of harm is only I in 6,
the seriousness of the potential injury is obvious and the social utility of the act is
nil.
(c) C reaches into a fire to recover a document which is about to burn; he
burns his hand thereby. Recovery should be permitted; though the probability
of injury was high, the probability of serious harm was small, and C's act was
socially useful, or at least excusable.
As applied to chronic alcoholism resulting from continued excessive drinking re-
covery would usually be denied because though the probability of harm is not great,
the potential seriousness of the harm is obvious and the conduct is socially undesirable.
Recovery should only be denied, however, provided it is found that the insured's ex-
cessive drinking was in fact of his own free will, a situation which will not be true in
many alcoholism cases.
*I. Four judges dissented on the grounds that the pleadings raised only the issue
of whether the husband and wife were partners in the business during the taxable
period, and that if allocation was adopted, the wife was entitled to 4,900/17,443 of the
whole, in the absence of an agreement that the husband should first be paid for his
services to the partnership.
2. The original decision in the instant case, based on the same findings of fact, was
promulgated in 7 T. C. No. i8, Docket No. 5864, June 13, 1946. The judgment was
that, of the entire income, 8o% was taxable to the husband and 20% to the wife. The
Presiding Judge of the Tax Court, on July I, 1946, ordered this original opinion re-
viewed by the court under INT. REV. CODE § 1118 (b).
3. INT. REV. CODE § 3796 defines the terms "partnership" and "partner." IN T. Rxv.
CODE §§ 181, 182 provide: ". . . Individuals carrying on business in partnership
shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity. . . . In computing
the net income of each partner, he shall include . . . His distributive share of the
ordinary net income or the ordinary net loss of the partnership. . . ." For the re-
quirements necessary for a valid family partnership, see Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue v. Tower, 66 Sup. Ct. 532, 537 (1946) ; Lusthaus v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 66 Sup. Ct. 539 (946) ; (1946) 46 COL. L. REV. 677; (1946) 32 VA. L.
Rav. 659; 464 C. C. H. 1946 Fed. Tax. Serv. 1 8603.
4. "The controlling question is whether the profits taxed are those of the peti-
tioner, and not how they are characterized by the Board or the parties." Champlin
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 71 F. (2d) 23, 26 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934). Ac-
cord, Berkowitz v. Commissioner, 1o8 F. (2d) 319 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) ; H. D. Web-
ster, 4 T. C. 1169 (1945).
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ment itself should determine the distribution of the profits.5 The alloca-
tion of income theory has been applied but generally not in litigation in
which validity of a family partnership was squarely in issue.6 The instant
case bases its conclusion that income should be allocated on the oft-stated
principle that income is to be taxed to those who earn or otherwise create
the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when paid.7 Capital
contributed by the wife earned a proportionate share of the profits pro-
duced by capital, and consequently such proportionate share should be
taxed to her. But the bulk of the income of the business was produced
by the personal services of the taxpayer, and therefore, despite his pur-
ported gift to the wife of 5o per cent of the assets, their agreement for
equal distribution of the profits "lacked the necessary reality to determine
by its terms the taxability of income earned," and is rejected." In its
stead, a "business arrangement" is created, in which a reasonable dis-
tribution of the profits is recognized. It is submitted, however, that any
attempted distinction between a "partnership" and a "business arrange-
ment" is a nebulous one.' In reality, the partnership is recognized to
the extent that a reasonable division of the profits produced by capital
will be countenanced. It is a compromise solution of partial recognition; 10
to give complete effect to the agreement of the parties appeared unreason-
5. In William J. Hirsch, 454 C. C. H. 1945 Fed Tax. Serv. ff 72o9 (M) (where
the wife contributed capital, skill, and services, and the agreement provided for an
equal division of profits), the Commissioner conceded the validity of the partnership
but determined that the earnings of the parties should be apportioned to the amount of
capital and the value of their separate services. The court in recognizing the partner-
ship, rejected this view, and held that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, part-
nership profits are to be shared equally; that there is a presumption that each partner
devotes all his time to the business and the court will not attempt to evaluate the serv-
ices of each partner. Accord, N. H. Hazlewood, 29 B. T. A. 595 (1933) ; Harriet A.
Taylor, 2 B. T. A. 1159 (1925). Cf. Francis A. Parker, 6 T. C. No. 125, p. II, May 7,
1946: "The proportion (8o%-2o%) agreed upon between them seems to be entirely
fair and reasonable. We see no reason whatever that we should disturb it."
6. Max German, 2 T. C. 474 (1943); cf. Berkowitz v. Commissioner, los F. (2d)
319 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) ; McKee v. Alexander, 48 F. (2d) 838 (W. D. Okla., 1931) ;
Alfred Hafner, 31 B. T. A. 338 (1934) ; First National Bank of Duluth, Special Adm'r,
Estate of Thomas A. Merritt, 13 B. T. A. io96 (1928). See William J. Hirsh, 454
C. C. H. 1945 Fed. Tax. Serv. It 72o9 (M) (where the Court distinguishes the German
case); Polisher, The Family Partnership (1945) 23 TAx MAG. 46, 49 (criticising
llocation in the German case).
7. "The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those
who earn or otherwise create the right to enjoy the benefit of it when paid." Helver-
ing v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 119 (1940) ; accord, Commissioner v. Tower, 66 Sup.
Ct. 532 (1946) ; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941) ; Helvering v. Clifford,
3o9 U. S. 331 (1940) ; Beazley v. Allen, 61 F. Supp. 929 (N. D. Ga., 1945) ; cf. Lucas
v. Earle, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
8. ". . . taxation is an eminently practical matter; . . . income is normally
taxable to him who earns it; and . . . agreements between members of an intimate
group are to be closely scrutinized and tested in the light of reality to the end that
realism and not mere form shall fix tax consequences. . . ." Instant case, 7 T. C.
No. 107.
9. It would seem that this distinction is attempted in order to avoid the holding
of the Hirsh case, 454 C. C. H. 1945 Fed. Tax. Serv. It 7209 (M). See 464 C. C. H.
1946 Fed. Tax. Serv. It 8603 (criticising recognition of a "business arrangement").
Io. This theory was advanced by Barkan, Family Partnerships under the Incote
Tax Law (1945) 44 MIcH. L. Rrv. 179, 21o: "If the partnership derives income
from capital and personal services, the partnership should be recognized only to the
extent of the contribution by the alleged 'partner; if the partner contributes capital, he
should be permitted to share in the income produced by capital. He ought to receive
only such portion of that income as his contribution bore to the total amount of capital
invested." Cf. Vernon, Taxation of the Income of Family Partnerships (1945) 59
HARv. L. REV. 209, 266. But see Polisher, supra note 6, at 49; cases cited supra note 5.
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able in view of the very nature of the business; to deny all recognition to
the association not only seemed unreasonable in view of the wife's un-
doubted contribution, but also might well deal a death blow to family
partnerships in general.1 The decision, then, is unquestionably a victory
for the taxpayer. Partial recognition is certainly to be preferred over
complete rejection,' 2 the previous fate of family partnerships that failed
to stand up under the close scrutiny of the court.'13 As such, the instant
case should encourage family partnerships. However, in pointing up
the court's evident partiality toward reasonable division of the profits,
it may make for the adoption of such reasonable provisions by the parties
themselves. On the other hand, the decision will undoubtedly create
considerable administrative difficulty,' 4 and may well lead to increased
litigation in the already troubled field of family partnerships. 1  Only the
application of the theory of the instant case to other factual situations, as,
for example, where the wife has contributed services, or both capital and
services, will supply the answer to these vexing problems.
Trusts-Preferred Stock-Apportionment of Dividends Between
Life Tenant and Remainderman-A testamentary trust contained
cumulative preferred stock for the benefit of a life tenant, remainder over.
Unpaid dividends had accumulated, and, for the express purpose of ex-
tinguishing these arrearages, the corporation effected a merger and re-
capitalization, whereby each share of old preferred stock was exchanged
for one share of new cumulative preferred stock'- plus one and one-
quarter shares of new no-par common stock. Both the new and the old
i. If the income from a bona fide contribution of capital by the wife is taxed to
the husband, merely because the other attributes of the association do not add up to a
partnership, it is hard to see how family partnerships could survive. It would be, in
effect, a denial for tax purposes of the wife's right to invest her own funds in a family
enterprise. Such a holding would seem clearly in contravention of previous decisions
on family enterprises. See Commissioner v. Tower, 66 Sup. Ct. 532, 537 (1946)
("There can be no question that a wife and a husband may, under certain circum-
stances, become partners for tax, as for other purposes") ; Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U. S. 465, 469 (1934) ("The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law per-
mits, cannot be doubted"). See also Paul, The Partnership in. Tax Avoidance (1945)
13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 121, digested in (1945) 23 TAX MAG. 532, 533; Olsen, Family
Partnerships (1946) 24 TAX MAG. 743, 745.
12. See, e. g., Abe Schreiber et al., 6 T. C. No. 92, Docket Nos. 3737, 3738, April
12, 1946; Alexander Jarvis, 464 C. C. H. 1946 Fed. Tax. Serv. 117519 (M) ; David
Wilson, 464 C. C. H. 1946 Fed. Tax. Serv. 7508 (M).
13, ". . . transactions between husband and wife clculated to reduce family
taxes should always be subjected to special scrutiny. . . . By the simple expedient
of drawing up papers, single tax earnings cannot be divided into two tax units and
surtaxes cannot be thus avoided." Commissioner v. Tower, 66 Sup. Ct. 532, 537-538
(1946). Accord, Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 335 (194o); cf. Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 477 (1939).
14. The mere mechanics of determining such apportionment in a mass of ensuing
family partnership cases will entail considerable administrative effort. Polisher, supra
note 6, at 49. But the Commissioner and the Tax Court are already determining the
basis of corporate shares, reasonable compensation for corporate officers, and what
proportion of a taxpayer's, earnings is attributable to invested capital, so that the bal-
ance may be reported as community property. Barkan, Family Partnerships under the
Income Tax Law (1945) 44 MICH. L. Rzv. 179, 200.
I5. Polisher, supra note 6, at 49.
i. Each aggregate share of new preferred stock consisted of one-half share Series
A and one-half share Series B. Each series had a 5% dividend rate as compared to
7% for the old preferred, and Series B, in addition, was convertible.
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preferred stocks were nonparticipating and of equal par value. The merger
did not affect the capital or surplus of the corporation, inasmuch as the
new common stock given to the holders of the old preferred shares was
based on capital value contributed by the common shareholders, who per-
mitted the issuance of an increased number of common shares. As a
result, the trustee surrendered the preferred stock and received an equar
number of shares of the new preferred and additional shares of common
stock. Upon audit of the trustee's account, allocation of the common stock
to the life tenant was refused; and it was ruled that apportionment between
the life tenant and remaindermen should be deferred, inter alia, until such
time as the new stock was sold.2  The trustee then sold some of the new
preferred stock and all of the additional 3 common stock, and a second
account was filed. The court below ruled there should be no apportion-
ment until all the stock received in the merger had been sold, and the
life tenant appealed. Held, the life tenant was entitled to an apportion-
ment of the proceeds of such of the shares of the exchanged stock as had
actually been sold. King Estate, 355 Pa. 64 (1946).
The instant decision is the third in which the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has considered the applicability of the Pennsylvania rule of
apportionment with reference to cumulative preferred stock.4  In brief,
the Pennsylvania rule is that on distribution of an extraordinary dividend,
in whatever form such dividend appears, the life tenant is entitled to
receive corporate earnings accrued during the life term, except such portion
thereof as may be necessary to preserve the intact value of the corpus
stock for the remainderman.5 When the problem of apportionment with
respect to dividends on cumulative preferred shares first came before the
court in Fisher's Estate," where the factual situation was substantially the
same as that in the instant case, all the proceeds from the sale of additional
shares were awarded to the life tenant. It was there decided that the
intact value of preferred shares was limited to par value 7 and that the'
payment of accumulated dividends out of capital contributions of common
stockholders ordinarily would not impair the intact value of the corpus
2. King Estate, 349 Pa. 27, 36 A. (2d) 504 (1944).
3. The word "additional" is used throughout to describe those shares of new no-
par common stock which were issued (on a one-and-one-quarter-to-one basis with the
old preferred stock) expressly for the purpose of discharging the dividends on the old
preferred.
4. The other two are King Estate, 349 Pa. 27, 36 A. (2d) 504 (944), and Fisher's
Estate, 344 Pa. 607, 26 A. (2d) 192 (1942). The problem has been treated in at least
two lower court decisions in Pennsylvania. Ormrod's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 245
(936), and Crozer's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 179 (1936).
5. Cases and comment dealing with the Pennsylvania rule are voluminous. The
development and ramifications of the rule in Pennsylvania case law are ably discussed
in Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 Atl. 295 (1932) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa.
457, 139 AtI. 200 (1927) ; Brigham, Pennsylvania Rides Governing the Allocation of
Receipts Derived by Trustees from Shares of Stock (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 358;
Faught, Statutory Solution of the Problem of Allocatioik Between Life Tenant and
Remainderman (1937) 1I TE:MP. L. Q. 139. For a general treatment of the rule, see
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 236; 2 Scorr ON TRUSTS (1939) § 236.
For the purposes of the rule, ordinary dividends are generally said to be those paid
regularly and at a uniform rate out of earnings of the corporation. REsTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) 1§ 236. The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary dividends
is discussed in Lueder's Estate, 337 Pa. 155, io A. (2d) 415 (194o), and Note (1938)
86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 765. The prima facie standard of intact value, under the rule, is
book value at the time of the testator's death. Waterhouse's Estate, supra at 427, 162
AtI. at 296; Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 42, 148 At. 907, 9o8 (930).
6. 344 Pa. 607, 26 A. (2d) 192 (I942), 47 DicK. L. REV. 56.
7. Id. at 614-615, 26 A. (2d) at 196.
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preferred stock, even though such contributions were not earnings 8 It is
difficult to see how the instant case can be reconciled with Fisher's Estate.9
It would appear from the instant case that the intact value of preferred
stock is to be calculated according to the rules applicable to common
stock, that is, that unpaid preferred dividends accruing prior to the death
of the testator are to be added to intact value."0 It would seem, also, that
capital value contributed by common stockholders will not be made avail-
able to life tenants in discharge of the obligation to pay preferred dividends
and that life tenants will be restricted to actual earnings during the life
terni.'- The dissenting opinion, on the basis of Fisher's Estate, urges
that the solution here lies in awarding all the proceeds from the sale of
the additional shares to the life tenant, rather than in apportioning the
proceeds of such of the new shares (both common and preferred) as have,
been sold.12 Although the instant case arose prior to the effective date
of the Pennsylvania Uniform Principal and Income Act,'3 it does not
appear that the problem presented in the case is specifically covered by
the Act.' 4 It has been noted that, despite the fact that the problem of the
instant case has been considered three times by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, ". . . the law is now in such a state that the result in any
particular case is a matter of pure speculation." 15
8. Id. at 612-613, 26 A. (2d) at 195. But cf. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa.
455, 179 AtI. 729 (1935) (common stock dividend paid out of surplus created by reduc-
tion of capital stock, held allocable to corpus on ground that it was a contribution from
corpus common stock) ; Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 Atl. 6o6 (1929), (1930) 78
U. oF PA. L. Rtv. 570 (new common stock with higher book value than same amount
of old common stock for which it was exchanged upon merger, held not apportionable
to life tenant until sale, liquidation or dividend distribution).
9. See instant case at 70 (dissenting opinion). The cases might be distinguished
on the fact that the original corpus stock in the instant case included common as well
as preferred shares, but this distinction would seem to be of little value, inasmuch as
it does not appear that the trustee's duties in his capacity of preferred shareholder
would depend upon the status of the common stock.
IO. See instant case at 69.
ii. Id. at 69-7o.
12. Id. at 7I.
13. 1945, May 3, P. L. 416, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 20, § 3471.
14. See FIDUc. REv., Nov. 1946, P. 4.
15. Id. at p. i. The article here cited contains an excellent analysis of the Fisher
case and the two King cases.
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